

Message Text

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ACTION IO-03

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: UN UNSC KS KN JA CA UK NZ RP
SUBJ: KOREA

REFS: STATE 18161 STATE 14349

1. USUN MISOFFS MET FEB 18 WITH REPS OF ROK, JAPAN, CANADA, UK, NEW ZEALAND, AND PHILIPPINES TO CONVEY USG POSITION (REFTELS)
THAT WE PREFER TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE ALTERNATIVE TO UN COMMAND (UNC) WITH "OTHER SIDE" AND THEREFORE DO NOT FAVOR SECURITY COUNCIL (SC) CONSIDERATION OF ISSUE AT THIS TIME.

2. UK AND JAPAN ASKED WHETHER US HAD HEARD ANYTHING FROM "OTHER SIDE" SINCE EARLY LAST FALL. WE REPLIED THAT WE UNAWARE OF ANY FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON KOREA WITH THEM.

3. IN COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT LENGTHY DISCUSSION, CANADA, UK AND NEW ZEALAND REPS SAID THAT USG NOW APPEARS TO HAVE FOUR CHOICES BEFORE IT:

(A) MAKE NEW EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE WITH OTHER SIDE OUTSIDE UN FRAMEWORK;

(B) PROPOSE TO SC THAT IT SEIZE ITSELF OF KOREAN QUESTION,
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PARTICULARLY UNC, IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATIVE PARA 2 OF

29TH UNGA RES ON KOREA;

(C) TAKE "UNILATERAL" STEPS IN DIRECTION OF DISSOLUTION OF UNC AND THEN SEEK SC APPROVAL OF THIS ACTION;

(D) TAKE NO ACTION AND, THEREFORE, PERMIT KOREAN ISSUE TO BE BROUGHT TO 30TH UNGA BY OTHER SIDE ON ITS OWN TERMS.

4. ALL DELS INVITED TO MEETING AGREED THAT THERE LITTLE IF ANY LIKELIHOOD THAT OTHER SIDE WILL AGREE TO NEGOTIATING ALTERNATIVE TO UNC ACCEPTABLE TO US BEFORE 30TH UNGA. OTHER SIDE HAS NO INCENTIVE TO REACH AGREEMENT. NORTH KOREANS MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR IN THEIR LOBBYING AND SPEECHMAKING AT 29TH UNGA THAT THEY SEEK PASSAGE OF THEIR OWN RES IN ORDER TO CLAIM THAT UN AT LAST ENDORSING THEIR VIEW THAT US TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM ROK. SINCE THEIR RES LOST ON TIE VOTE IN FIRST COMMITTEE, THEY ALREADY CLAIMING THAT THEY ACHIEVED "MORAL VICTORY" AT 29TH UNGA WHICH WILL BE CONVERTED INTO SUBSTANTIVE VICTORY AT 30TH UNGA. CANADIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS ARGUED THAT MAINTENANCE OF UNC AS IS IN REALITY NOW SERVES INTERESTS OF NORTH KOREA MORE THAN IT DOES ROK AND ITS FRIENDS SINCE IT PERMITS NORTH KOREAN SUPPORTERS TO RAISE KOREAN ISSUE ANNUALLY IN UN TO SCORE PROPAGANDA POINTS. CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND BELIEVE THAT SHOULD UNC BE ELIMINATED AND UN PRESENCE IN KOREA ENDED, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR NORTH KOREA TO PERSUADE MAJORITY OF UN TO CONTINUE TO DEBATE KOREAN ISSUE.

5. THOSE PRESENT ALSO AGREED THAT IF WE SIMPLY ASK FOR SC MEETING TO DISCUSS KOREA WITHOUT MAKING SPECIFIC PROPOSAL, BOTH PRC AND SOVIETS WILL ARGUE STRONGLY THAT IT SIMPLY "PROPAGANDA MOVE". IN SUCH CASE WE UNLIKELY TO GAIN NECESSARY NINE VOTES FOR INSCRIPTION OF KOREAN ITEM.

6. CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND REPS, STRESSING THAT THEY OFFERING "PERSONAL SUGGESTION" NOT CLEARED BY THEIR CAPITALS, ARGUED THAT ROK AND ITS SUPPORTERS WOULD GAIN MOST FROM SOME "UNILATERAL CONCESSION" BY US AND THE ROK ON UNC AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THIS SPRING. THEY (SUPPORTED STRONGLY BY UK) RECOMMENDED THAT WE SHOULD THEN SUBSEQUENTLY REQUEST SC MEETING
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TO GAIN APPROVAL OF "CONCESSIONS" ON UNC. IN SUCH CASE, MOST SC MEMBERS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO RESIST REQUEST FOR INSCRIPTION. EVEN IF SC FAILED TO TAKE ACTION ON OUR REQUEST OR RESULT WAS VETO BY OTHER SIDE, WE WOULD GAIN PROPAGANDA VICTORY BY HAVING MADE SERIOUS EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT UNGA RES BY MAKING SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON UNC TO THE SC. MOREOVER, ONUS FOR BLOCKING PROGRESS ON ISSUE WOULD BE PLACED ON OTHER SIDE, WHICH WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY

PUBLICLY ITS NEGATIVE STAND IN SC. ALL PRESENT AT MEETING ADMITTED THAT THEY HAD NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR JUST WHAT TYPE OF CONCESSIONS COULD IN FACT BE MADE WITHOUT DAMAGING CURRENT ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENT. THEY ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WAS TASK OF US LEGAL EXPERTS. NEW ZEALANDER NOTED THAT POSSIBLY SOME USE COULD BE MADE OF STATEMENT BY NORTH KOREA AT 29TH UNGA EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO KEEP ARMISTICE IN FORCE.

7. ALL PRESENT EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF TIMING OF ANY MOVE TO TAKE UNC TO SC. ON KOREAN ISSUE, SC WILL HAVE "FRIENDLY PRESIDENT" (COSTA RICA AND FRANCE) IN MARCH AND APRIL AND RELATIVELY HOSTILE ONES (GUYANA AND IRAQ) IN MAY AND JUNE. WHILE FRIENDLY ITALY WILL BE CHAIRMAN OF SC IN JULY, ALL AGREED THAT OTHER SIDE LIKELY TO HAVE SURFACED ITS ANNUAL "HOSTILE" KOREAN RES BY THEN.

8. ALL AGREED THAT IF IT PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE BILATERALLY OR TAKE ISSUE TO SC, WE WILL BE IN EXTREMELY UNFAVORABLE POSITION AS 30TH UNGA OPENS. OTHER SIDE LIKELY TO SUBMIT RES VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO LAST SESSION'S HOSTILE RES. EVEN IF WE ONCE AGAIN INTRODUCE OUR OWN RES AND SEEK DIFFICULT OBJECTIVE OF OVERTURNING THEIR PRIORITY, WE FACE SITUATION WHERE FIRST COMMITTEE ALMOST CERTAIN TO GIVE SIMPLE MAJORITY TO BOTH FRIENDLY AND HOSTILE RESSES. WE CANNOT CONVINCINGLY ARGUE IN 30TH UNGA PLENARY THAT KOREAN RES COMES UNDER IMPORTANT QUESTION RULE REQUIRING 2/3 MAJORITY FOR PASSAGE SINCE "WE GAVE AWAY" THIS LEGAL ARGUMENT BY NOT OBJECTING TO PASSAGE OUR RES BY SIMPLY MAJORITY AT 29TH UNGA.

9. CANADIAN AND NEW ZEALAND REPS FEARED IMPACT ON US OF PASSAGE HOSTILE KOREAN RES AT 30TH UNGA. THEY SPECULATED THAT IT COULD, ON THE ONE HAND, INCREASE US PUBLIC DISILLUSIONMENT WITH UN (AS REFLECTED IN DEC 6 SCALI SPEECH), WHILE CONFIDENTIAL

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ON THE OTHER HAND, IT COULD INCREASE SENTIMENT IN US CONGRESS TO LESSEN US MILITARY AND OTHER COMMITMENTS TO ROK.

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